Monday, April 6, 2009
People Misunderstand Science
This
Discover piece reminded me of the other part missing from
the debate about Sociology's standpoint as a science or not, as (it
seems to me) that many people have a fundamental misunderstanding of
what science is or claims to be. To be fair, part of the blame for this
misunderstanding must be placed on the shoulders of introductory
science courses (pre-college) science where (too often) the rhetoric
tends to suggest something as an absolute, universal fact when, in
fact, science only claims that "this is what is known at this time,
given this evidence". Science is always reinventing itself, and I
(personally) know of nobody in any of the sciences (biology, physics,
etc.) who claim that something is absolutely true now and forever.
There are very few actual laws in the sciences (although there are many
theories that are 'accepted' as true, but they are not established as
truth). But this could become a long ranting blog post in itself, so
without further ranting, I'll end this discussion at that and this
choice quote:
"First off, there is no such thing as scientism. What he is describing is simply science, because science by its very nature is an attempt to explain all things using natural processes. And he seems to think science has no imagination.
"First off, there is no such thing as scientism. What he is describing is simply science, because science by its very nature is an attempt to explain all things using natural processes. And he seems to think science has no imagination.
That’s insane. Without imagination, all we can do is categorize the world. Assigning names and numbers, statistics and categories. And while that sort of thing is important in the scientific process, it’s not science itself. Without imagination, science is a dictionary."
On a side note (and to rile some feathers that I probably
shouldn't be), try reading the article replacing
'religion'/'supernatural' with [de]constructionism (that's how I have
started reading some [de]construction texts anyway, only in
reverse--sadly, that is not a joke, I have fallen into that habit,
although I admit it is a bad one as it makes me too dismissive and it's
not my intention to just dismiss anything off-hand).
Max Weber & More on the Foundations of Sociology as a Science
Anybody offended by the conception of sociology as a science (I am in
favor of that conception--in case anybody missed that) may skip this
paragraph as you'll simply dismiss the argument anyway (so I save your
blood pressure from rising a little):
On my drive to and back from the Midwestern Sociological Society (MSS) meeting on Sunday, I got into a discussion with a classmate from my contemporary sociological theory course about which theories should (and should not) be the focus on modern sociology. Despite the controversial nature of the debate, it was kept on civil terms with both of us recognizing that the other had a different conception of 'sociology'. I would like to say that my conception of sociology as a science is simply due to my background in computer science/logical sciences; however, to do so would be an injustice to my background--which is more than one of the most rationally oriented sciences in existence (computers only think in binary, so to program them, you must be able to think using the same type of logic). If that were the case, that it was simply due to the way I have been taught to think, then the debate would have been less pertinent. Instead, it is because I have been taught to think in many, many different ways and try to keep up with as much as I can of other academic fields through taking a diversity of classes and through interacting with a wide range of people. My opponent in the debate expressed an interest in other fields but admitted to a relative ignorance of fields outside of sociology, where almost all undergraduate studies had been concentrated (beyond the general education requirements, of course). As such, during the debate it became painfully obvious that my advocacy of sociology as a science comes just as much from my knowledge of the fact that modern sociologists (that aren't treating it as a science) are simply repeating the labor of other fields, such as Englih, philosophy, linguistics, etc. but in ways that are either insufficiently refined or through "quasi-science". That is not to say that individuals conducting Sociological research outside of the scientific framework don't have their place, that is just to say that I feel that they are doing a disservice both to themselves and to the field as a whole--since the field has become torn in an epistemological pissing war, not over the conception of societal systems as they currently exist, but over units of analysis ([de]constructionists view the world from the individual level--which, in my opinion, clearly has no place in sociology as that then ceases to look at how GROUPS form a COMMON view that allows them to communicate, negotiate, divide labor, etc.) Again, I am not saying that these conceptions of people are flawed, simply that they are asking the worng questions and leading to an unsustainable structure under the umbrella of a word that needs to be more clearly defined in order to continue to stand. Weber, roughly a hundred years ago, provided such a definition of 'sociology' (while admitted to its plurality of meanings) when he says that it means: "the science whose object is to interpret the meaning of social action and thereby give a causal explanation of the way in which the action proceeds and the effects which it produces" (1994:7). One can simply dismiss all of this as the ranting of an 'elite white male' and the definition of science as constricting knowledge and whatever else, but I say even if a model is not perfect, we have to start somewhere and (as in most sciences) the model should be refined as time goes on to account for weaknesses. It could be that the model is flawed and must be replaced, but then (as with most sciences) both models should be in co-existence until one model proves to be superior to the other in PREDICTING future outcomes given a cause and the conditions in which it can be duplicated. And even then, the old model often lives on so future scholars can learn from what it got right and what it got wrong, it should not simply be dismissed off hand. It is wrong to go to texts with a dismissive eye, looking only for what one disagrees with and not what one can learn from the texts--even though I disagree with whether or no [de]constructionism has a place in sociology (as a science), I do note it's potential in explaining variance and serving as a philosophical argument about an individual's conceptions of reality; however it is not a model that can lead to predictions or provide causal explanations so it does not qualify as a scientific underpinning. One can argue about what it means for something to be a 'science', but then one can argue every word, we must have some common ground to lay a foundation for a field on and Weber's definition, using casue and effects, is pretty well established view of science (in both the East and West).
Now that my discussion of sociology as a science is over, let me discuss Weber in slightly more detail. Whereas Durkheim focused almost exclusively on the causes that led to the creation of functional system pieces (stating that function is the effect), Weber does not argue that the function is the effect of various causes but does argue that we must start from the function to "determine which social action it is important to interpret and understand if we are to explain a particular system" (1994:18). Similarly, Weber does not stop at the functioning system as the focus of his analysis and calls for an attempt to understand MORE than what the natural sciences are able to learn about their objects of inquiry: "we are in a position, not only to formulate functional interrelations and regularirites (or 'laws'), but also to achieve something which must lie for ever beyond the reach of all forms of 'natural science' (in the sence of the formulation of causal laws governing events and systems and the explanation of individual events in terms of them). What we can do is to 'understand' the behaviour of the individuals involved, wheras we do not 'understand' the behaviour of, say, cells." (19). From my previous paragraph this is something that, in some ways, I disagree with, as the field of individual understanding seems better suited to psychology (and other disciplines) and less within sociology; however, in the case of how the individual fits into the group that seems to be within the domain of a study of societies/groups (it is only when you begin looking soley at the domain of the individuals interpretation that you enter a grey zone). In fact, later, Weber does make a statement that places the study of the individual clearly within the context of the group/scoiety: "For the question which must always be asked first before the real empirical work of sociology can begin is: which motives led and continue to lead individual functionaries and members of this 'community' to believe in such a way that it came into being and continues to exist?" (1994:21). The question is not 'how does an individual actor understand the world' but 'how does an individual actor accept and find himself/herself belonging to the system in which they exist'--or, in Weber's terms, "The formation of function concepts, in terms of relationship to the 'whole', is simply part of the preliminary work" (1994:21-22).
Later parts of the Weber make it clearer that his views are more along the 'antipositivist' line of thinking, often leaning toward looking at the conceptions of individuals and critiquing the system of causality. However, throughout these readings he does maintain a focus on what ends up on the group level (such as an exchange). I think Weber, rightfully, points out the flaw in looking at the whole without looking at the parts, but I also believe that some of his arguments were taken to an extreme that I, personally, did not feel he was advocating for--he still seemed to be arguing for some form of a model of interactions that included some objective points, but allowed some subjectivity. That's assuming I didn't misread anything, at least.
To retun the question of social power that began this blog, Weber defines power as: "every possibility within a social relationship of imposing one's own will, even against opposition, without regard to the basis of this possibility" (1994:38). In addition, power is described as "diffuse" since there are innumerable conditions and combinations of conditions that allow power to manifest itself within a social structure. And since I have reached a full circle from the first post to this post (the last post before all posts are reviewed), it seems that I have come to a logical stopping point for this blog, although much more can be said about Weber (and perhaps more will be said in posts beyond the review period--if time and motivation allows).
On my drive to and back from the Midwestern Sociological Society (MSS) meeting on Sunday, I got into a discussion with a classmate from my contemporary sociological theory course about which theories should (and should not) be the focus on modern sociology. Despite the controversial nature of the debate, it was kept on civil terms with both of us recognizing that the other had a different conception of 'sociology'. I would like to say that my conception of sociology as a science is simply due to my background in computer science/logical sciences; however, to do so would be an injustice to my background--which is more than one of the most rationally oriented sciences in existence (computers only think in binary, so to program them, you must be able to think using the same type of logic). If that were the case, that it was simply due to the way I have been taught to think, then the debate would have been less pertinent. Instead, it is because I have been taught to think in many, many different ways and try to keep up with as much as I can of other academic fields through taking a diversity of classes and through interacting with a wide range of people. My opponent in the debate expressed an interest in other fields but admitted to a relative ignorance of fields outside of sociology, where almost all undergraduate studies had been concentrated (beyond the general education requirements, of course). As such, during the debate it became painfully obvious that my advocacy of sociology as a science comes just as much from my knowledge of the fact that modern sociologists (that aren't treating it as a science) are simply repeating the labor of other fields, such as Englih, philosophy, linguistics, etc. but in ways that are either insufficiently refined or through "quasi-science". That is not to say that individuals conducting Sociological research outside of the scientific framework don't have their place, that is just to say that I feel that they are doing a disservice both to themselves and to the field as a whole--since the field has become torn in an epistemological pissing war, not over the conception of societal systems as they currently exist, but over units of analysis ([de]constructionists view the world from the individual level--which, in my opinion, clearly has no place in sociology as that then ceases to look at how GROUPS form a COMMON view that allows them to communicate, negotiate, divide labor, etc.) Again, I am not saying that these conceptions of people are flawed, simply that they are asking the worng questions and leading to an unsustainable structure under the umbrella of a word that needs to be more clearly defined in order to continue to stand. Weber, roughly a hundred years ago, provided such a definition of 'sociology' (while admitted to its plurality of meanings) when he says that it means: "the science whose object is to interpret the meaning of social action and thereby give a causal explanation of the way in which the action proceeds and the effects which it produces" (1994:7). One can simply dismiss all of this as the ranting of an 'elite white male' and the definition of science as constricting knowledge and whatever else, but I say even if a model is not perfect, we have to start somewhere and (as in most sciences) the model should be refined as time goes on to account for weaknesses. It could be that the model is flawed and must be replaced, but then (as with most sciences) both models should be in co-existence until one model proves to be superior to the other in PREDICTING future outcomes given a cause and the conditions in which it can be duplicated. And even then, the old model often lives on so future scholars can learn from what it got right and what it got wrong, it should not simply be dismissed off hand. It is wrong to go to texts with a dismissive eye, looking only for what one disagrees with and not what one can learn from the texts--even though I disagree with whether or no [de]constructionism has a place in sociology (as a science), I do note it's potential in explaining variance and serving as a philosophical argument about an individual's conceptions of reality; however it is not a model that can lead to predictions or provide causal explanations so it does not qualify as a scientific underpinning. One can argue about what it means for something to be a 'science', but then one can argue every word, we must have some common ground to lay a foundation for a field on and Weber's definition, using casue and effects, is pretty well established view of science (in both the East and West).
Now that my discussion of sociology as a science is over, let me discuss Weber in slightly more detail. Whereas Durkheim focused almost exclusively on the causes that led to the creation of functional system pieces (stating that function is the effect), Weber does not argue that the function is the effect of various causes but does argue that we must start from the function to "determine which social action it is important to interpret and understand if we are to explain a particular system" (1994:18). Similarly, Weber does not stop at the functioning system as the focus of his analysis and calls for an attempt to understand MORE than what the natural sciences are able to learn about their objects of inquiry: "we are in a position, not only to formulate functional interrelations and regularirites (or 'laws'), but also to achieve something which must lie for ever beyond the reach of all forms of 'natural science' (in the sence of the formulation of causal laws governing events and systems and the explanation of individual events in terms of them). What we can do is to 'understand' the behaviour of the individuals involved, wheras we do not 'understand' the behaviour of, say, cells." (19). From my previous paragraph this is something that, in some ways, I disagree with, as the field of individual understanding seems better suited to psychology (and other disciplines) and less within sociology; however, in the case of how the individual fits into the group that seems to be within the domain of a study of societies/groups (it is only when you begin looking soley at the domain of the individuals interpretation that you enter a grey zone). In fact, later, Weber does make a statement that places the study of the individual clearly within the context of the group/scoiety: "For the question which must always be asked first before the real empirical work of sociology can begin is: which motives led and continue to lead individual functionaries and members of this 'community' to believe in such a way that it came into being and continues to exist?" (1994:21). The question is not 'how does an individual actor understand the world' but 'how does an individual actor accept and find himself/herself belonging to the system in which they exist'--or, in Weber's terms, "The formation of function concepts, in terms of relationship to the 'whole', is simply part of the preliminary work" (1994:21-22).
Later parts of the Weber make it clearer that his views are more along the 'antipositivist' line of thinking, often leaning toward looking at the conceptions of individuals and critiquing the system of causality. However, throughout these readings he does maintain a focus on what ends up on the group level (such as an exchange). I think Weber, rightfully, points out the flaw in looking at the whole without looking at the parts, but I also believe that some of his arguments were taken to an extreme that I, personally, did not feel he was advocating for--he still seemed to be arguing for some form of a model of interactions that included some objective points, but allowed some subjectivity. That's assuming I didn't misread anything, at least.
To retun the question of social power that began this blog, Weber defines power as: "every possibility within a social relationship of imposing one's own will, even against opposition, without regard to the basis of this possibility" (1994:38). In addition, power is described as "diffuse" since there are innumerable conditions and combinations of conditions that allow power to manifest itself within a social structure. And since I have reached a full circle from the first post to this post (the last post before all posts are reviewed), it seems that I have come to a logical stopping point for this blog, although much more can be said about Weber (and perhaps more will be said in posts beyond the review period--if time and motivation allows).
Sunday, April 5, 2009
Sorokin & Veblen
This post is a bit
later than usual, but the reading for March 31st were some history of Pitrim Alexandrovich Sorokin,
the first head of Harvard's sociology department, and Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class.
The reading about Sorokin was interesting, to me, less because of the
politics involved (I've always contended that academia has more
politics than any other field--other than politics proper, of course)
but rather for the fact that Sorokin, despite having been marginalized
and outcast from the field was still respected by enough of the field
to obtain his impressive victory of over 60% (considering the campaign
was only to give him a 2nd nomination as ASA president in order to
honor him, not necessarily the presidency itself). The campaign was
nice and simple, obtaining a supporter from each major region of the US
who supported honoring Sorokin with the traditional 2nd nomination for
ASA president by mailing out letters asking for support of his
nomination before the actual nomination (originally employing a
snowballing strategy where each individual would personally mail
several other individuals and they kept one master list to prevent
multiple mailings to the same individual). Simple enough, but very
effective.
As for the Veblen piece, once again I have to admire his biting tongue-in-cheek rhetoric as he discusses the leisure class comparing their activities to that of babarians, discussing the wastefulness of consumption, the necessary ugliness of fashion as a status symbol and the rejection of that ugliness leading to the constant cylce of new fashion, and even a critique of higher education as a means of wasting lots of time and resources so that students may learn useless information like the languages of dead Southern European people (e.g. Greek and Latin). Veblen sum up the constant wastefulness iin the consumerism oriented leisure class, looking down on what we would today refer to as 'cheap crap': "So thoroughly has the habit of approving the expensive and disapproving the inexpensive been ingrained into our thinking that we instinctively insist upon at least some measure of wasteful expensiveness in all our consumption, even in the case of goods which are consumed in strict privacy and without the slightest thought display" (112). Truthful in its absurdity and absurd in its truthfulness, it makes me wonder what he would have accomplished had he turned his pen to the novel as opposed to his colorful examination of society. A particularly fun passage, that sums up Veblen's model of the requirements for what is valued by the lesiure class comes near the end: "English orthography satisfies all the requirements of the canons of reputability under the law of conscious waste. It is archaic, cumbrous, and ineffective; its acquisition consumes much time and effort; failure to acquire it is easy of detection" (257). Veblen explains ownership as motivated by emulation which is then, in turn, emulated within society structures all for the sake of 'honor' through a display of weath-based status (35). There are a few other choice quotes throughout, such as 124 with the critique of fashion, but this summary has gotten at the gist of the argument and made Veblen's unique style. While the insights Veblen has brought to the field have been repeated by others in academia and popular media, none quite match his combination of bitter satire with insightful critique that make Veblen a timeless read.
As for the Veblen piece, once again I have to admire his biting tongue-in-cheek rhetoric as he discusses the leisure class comparing their activities to that of babarians, discussing the wastefulness of consumption, the necessary ugliness of fashion as a status symbol and the rejection of that ugliness leading to the constant cylce of new fashion, and even a critique of higher education as a means of wasting lots of time and resources so that students may learn useless information like the languages of dead Southern European people (e.g. Greek and Latin). Veblen sum up the constant wastefulness iin the consumerism oriented leisure class, looking down on what we would today refer to as 'cheap crap': "So thoroughly has the habit of approving the expensive and disapproving the inexpensive been ingrained into our thinking that we instinctively insist upon at least some measure of wasteful expensiveness in all our consumption, even in the case of goods which are consumed in strict privacy and without the slightest thought display" (112). Truthful in its absurdity and absurd in its truthfulness, it makes me wonder what he would have accomplished had he turned his pen to the novel as opposed to his colorful examination of society. A particularly fun passage, that sums up Veblen's model of the requirements for what is valued by the lesiure class comes near the end: "English orthography satisfies all the requirements of the canons of reputability under the law of conscious waste. It is archaic, cumbrous, and ineffective; its acquisition consumes much time and effort; failure to acquire it is easy of detection" (257). Veblen explains ownership as motivated by emulation which is then, in turn, emulated within society structures all for the sake of 'honor' through a display of weath-based status (35). There are a few other choice quotes throughout, such as 124 with the critique of fashion, but this summary has gotten at the gist of the argument and made Veblen's unique style. While the insights Veblen has brought to the field have been repeated by others in academia and popular media, none quite match his combination of bitter satire with insightful critique that make Veblen a timeless read.
